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ABSTRACT
The increasing piracy in the Gulf of Aden has captured the attention of the international
community. Somali pirates have proven their ability to attack all types of vessels from
small yachts to giant oil supertankers. As a result, series of serious efforts by international
community have been undertaken to put an end to this emerging phenomenon. These
include, deploying the biggest anti-piracy fleet in modern history, permitting warships to
purse pirates in Somali territorial waters under special conditions, and the new approach
toward establishing international tribunals to prosecute pirates. However, there is a
growing need to re-examine Somali piracy counter-measures and evaluate their
effectiveness. In this respect, a profound analysis of the circumstances surrounding
Somali piracy is required. It is crucial to question to what extent the current anti-piracy
efforts respond to the original roots of the problem and the needs of Somalia. This
research critically analyzes anti-piracy efforts taken by the international community and
its impact on the ground. In this regard, a holistic approach was taken to examine Somali
piracy. Any anti-piracy measures have to respond to the roots of the problem in order to
guarantee their effectiveness in the long-term. Undoubtedly, building a military coalition
to patrol ships passing through Somali waters is a needed measure to deter pirates.
However, it is crucial to ask ourselves to what extent such measures are sustainable and
to what extent it responds to the roots of the problem. Thus, the international community
needs to look to the bigger picture and to carefully analyze factors contributing to spread
of piracy especially off the coast of Somali. The solution to piracy may lie on the land not
in the sea.
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I. Introduction
Seas and oceans has been the theatre for piratical operations for centuries. Although
maritime piracy is one of the oldest crimes, it is still alive and flourishing on the world’s
commercial sea-lanes. 1 Recent years have witnessed a surge in piratical attacks.
Observers call it: ―a new golden age of piracy.‖ 2 In response, the international
community has adopted new anti-piracy measures and new rules of engagement going
beyond the traditional measures within the framework of International law. It is crucial to
revisit the modern piracy of the twenty first century by examining piracy off the coast of
Somalia and evaluating the effectiveness of international and regional anti-piracy
measures adopted to counter Somali piracy.
The case of Somali piracy is particularly pressing for five reasons. First, Somali
pirates are a good example of modern piracy with its sophisticated operations using hightechnology. Second, Somali piracy challenges global maritime security as it poses a
significant threat to International trade by targeting the strategic area of Gulf of Aden;
where as 30% of the world oil transports through.3 Over 20,000 vessels pass through this
area each year.4 Third, Somali pirates have made a record of successful hijacking of all

types of vessels. According to International Maritime Bureau, there were 111 attempted
pirate attack the in the Gulf of Aden in 2008, of which 42 were successful, resulting in
the capture of 815 merchant seamen. 5 This represents an increase of nearly 200% from
2007,6 accounting for an estimated 40% of the 293 pirate attacks reported worldwide in
2008.7 Further, Somali pirates are accredited for ―the largest ship seizure in history, that
of the oil-tanker Sirus Star.‖8
1

Over 6.8 billion tons of goods are moved by sea annually in a global trade cycle worth $7.4 trillion, with
up to 90% of international trade traveling by ship at some point. See Generally, Rubrick Biegon, Somali
Piracy and the International Response, Foreign Policy in Focus, Jan. 29, 2009,
http://www.fpif.org/articles/somali_piracy _and_the_international _response.
2
Kerry Nankivell, Troubled waters, Foreign Policy, Nov./Dec. 2004.
3
Eric Watkins, Now Russians enter Somalia, Oil & Gas J. 38,(2008).
4
Rawle O. King, Ocean Piracy and Its Impact on Insurance, Congressional Research Service, Feb. 6,
2009.
5
Mark Hosenball , Raising the Ransoms, Newsweek, Vol.153, April 10, 2009.
6
Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, Maritime Piracy: Report: Attacks On Ships Rise 14% Worldwide in 2008,
EURE, Jan 20 (2009).
7
Lauren Ploch ET AL., Piracy of The Cost off The Horn of Africa, Congressional Research Service, No.75700 R40528, Sept.28, 2009.
8
Daniele Archibugi & Marina Chiarugi, Piracy Challenges Global Governance, Open Democracy, (2009),
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/piracy-challenges-global-governance.
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Fourth, Somali piracy has tremendous economic implications worldwide, in a time of
global financial crisis. ―By one estimate, due to piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the cost of
insuring a container went from $900 in 2007 to $9,000 in the closing months of 2008.‖9
The Suez Canal, for example, witnessed a steep drop in revenue affecting Egypt’s main
source of foreign currency.10 Also, the cost of the fuel bill has increased 25% for
European ships which sail around the Cape of Good Hope to avoid Somali piracy. 11
Indeed, even the average person will experience higher prices because shipping fees have
increased due to the increased costs of security, higher insurance premiums, ransoms and
extra fuel for longer routes.12 Ultimately, everyone is affected in one way or another.
And the case of Somali piracy shows the dynamics existing among pirates, the world
navies, international organizations, and regional actors. And last but not least, Somali
Piracy poses a serious test to the traditional legal framework and its efficiency in fighting
maritime piracy.
All of the previous distinctive features of Somali piracy make it the ideal choice to be
the prime case of study. This research focuses on providing an in depth analysis of
Somali piracy counter-measures, taken on international and regional levels, and most
importantly to what extent these measures respond to the roots of the problem. Although
new and genuine anti-piracy measures were adopted to counter Somali piracy, those
measures are short term, counter-productive, and fail to respond to the special
circumstances surrounding Somali piracy. This paper argues that although genuine
international and regional anti-piracy measures have been adopted to suppress Somali
piracy, those measures are misguided as they miss the root causes of the crisis. Antipiracy efforts in Somalia, simply put, are genuine but misguided.
The scope of the paper is to examine factors behind the emergence of modern piracy
in the case of Somali piracy and to monitor the extent to which international and regional
anti-piracy measures adopted have respond to the causes of piracy. The research does not
cover historical literature on piracy or in-depth analysis legal framework on piracy.

9

Rawle O. King, supra note 4.
Louis Wasse, Somali Piracy Costs Suez Canal Business, Chronicle Foreign Service, April 19, 2009,
http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-04-29/news/17192647_1_somali-pirates-suez-canal-somali-coast.
11
Sherry Shannon, Ships, Piracy in Numbers, Fin. Main Ed., Nov. 28, 2008, at 26.
12
Q&A: Somali Piracy, BBC News, Jan. 9 (2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7734985.stm.
10
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This paper is divided into four chapters. Chapter one provides a background on
Somali piracy. Chapter two tackles the legal framework in international law applicable to
maritime piracy. Chapter three highlights anti-piracy efforts, on the international and
regional levels, to counter Somali piracy. Chapter four critically analyzes those measures
and concludes that the current anti-piracy measures are counter-productive and inefficient
because of practical constrains and legal complexities. The last part is the conclusion
which paves the way for a durable solution to piracy in the Gulf of Aden.
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II. Background on Somali Piracy
This section offers in depth analysis of Somali pirates: attacks, tactics, land bases and
their organizational structure. The perspective of pirates themselves is also highlighted. It
is hard to separate Somali piracy form Somalia ongoing situation. Certain features of
Somalia have made piracy possible and allow it to flourish. Thus, a quick overview of
Somali is needed to grasp the bigger picture surrounding Somali piracy. A special focus
is given to the main factors contributed to spread of piracy activities launched from
Somalia. ―If the international community is to comprehensively address the crisis, its first
task is to understand the background."13
A. Overview of Somalia
Somalia is the country form which pirates initiate their attacks. Back to Somalia,
pirates bring their kidnapped ships. In Somalia, the hostages are kept till ransom is paid.
All pirates land bases are located in Somalia. All pirates are Somali nationals, unlike
piracy elsewhere.14 No wonder, all piratical activities in the Gulf of Aden and Indian
Ocean are attributed to Somali pirates and labeled Somali piracy. For the first time,
piracy is associated with one single country: Somalia. The link between Somalia and
piracy is unmistakable. Therefore, a better understanding of piracy requires shedding
some light on Somalia ongoing situation.
Somalia is strategically situated in Eastern Africa bordering the Gulf of Aden and the
Indian Ocean with a long coastline extending for 3,025 km. 15 Somalia, a former British
(Somaliland) and Italian (the reminder of the country) protectorates, has become
independent and unified in 1960. After the Somali president, Abdi Rashid Ali
Shermarke, was assassinated in 1969, the army under Major General Mohamed Siad
Barre took power and established a dictatorship regime. For two decades Somalia
enjoyed stability and effective central government, till Barre was ousted in January 1991.
As a result, a tribal power struggle erupted between clan warlords. The North-western
13

Rubrick Biegon , Somali Piracy and the International Response, Foreign Policy in Focus, Jan. 29, 2009,
http://www.fpif.org/articles/somali_piracy _and_the_international _response.
14
See, Peter T. Leeson, An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization, Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 115, no. 6, 2007 at 1050 (indicating that pirates of the Caribbean between 1715 and 1725,
for example, were racially diverse and belong to multiple countries unlike Somali pirates).
15
See Appendix A: Map of Somalia
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region of Somaliland had unilaterally declared itself independent in 1991, while the
Government of Puntland controlled the semi-autonomous region of Puntland. Since then,
the Somali state collapsed. In 1992, a desperate attempt by UN peacekeeping forces to
restore order and safeguard relief supplies miserably failed. As a result, the US mission
ended in 1994 and UN peacekeepers left Somalia in 1995. The world abandoned
Somalia, leaving it alone to face its destiny. 16
In 2004, a two year peace process led by Kenya was concluded with the election
of Abdullah Yusuf as president of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of
Somalia and the formation of an interim government; known as Somalia Transitional
Federal Institutions (TFIs) which included a 275-member parliamentary body called The
Transitional Federal Assembly (TFA). The transitional government moved from Kenya
to Somalia. However, this weak government has failed to restore peace and order in a
country torn by ethnic tribal conflict. At the same time, Somalia witnessed relative
stability with the spread of Islamic Courts in regions where Islamic Shari’a was applied
by Islamists. Consequently, a union of Islamic Courts (UIC) was established, sweeping
vast regions of Somalia and attacking the Transitional Federal Government. In December
2006, Ethiopia invaded Somalia in support of the Federal government against the UIC. A
new Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) was headed by UIC to face
Ethiopian invasion.

In 2007, the UN Security Council authorized African Union

peacekeeping forces to Somalia. 17
New peace talks in Djibouti sponsored by the UN started in June 2008 between the
TFG and ARS. As a result, a TFG-ARS unity government was formed. In January 2009,
Ethiopia withdrew from Somalia. A new expanded TFA with 550 seats elected Sheikh
Shrief Sheikh Ahmed the former chairman of the UIC and ARS to be the new Somali
president on 31 January 2009. The new president and unity government was widely
supported by the UN and the West. The TFIs are based on the Transitional Federal
Charter (TFC), which outlines a five-year mandate leading to the establishment of a new
Somali constitution and a transition to a representative government following national
16

Timeline: Somalia, A Chronology of Key Event, BBC News, Feb. 11, 2010,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072611.stm.
17
Somalia : Background, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/so.html.
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elections. However, in January 2009 the TFA amended the TFC to extend TFG's mandate
until 2011. Still, the institutions of TFIs remain weak. Massive world support is needed to
rebuild the country from scratch. However, little has been done in this area. 18
To sum up, Somalia lived almost two decades of political turmoil, civil war, and
ethnic tribal conflict. Internal fighting has torn the country apart. Even, the new TFG
under Sheikh Shrief continues fighting Al-Shabab, a group of radical Islamists with close
link of Al-Qaeda. The seat of the government in Mogadishu is under heavy fire. The
government forces and African Union peacekeeping forces continue to fight a bloody
battle with Al Shabab militia. On the ground, the government of Sheikh Shrief is
controlling only few kilometers of Somalia, the area around the presidential palace in
Mogadishu. Therefore, the dream for peace and stability seems to be far away.19
Somalia is a perfect example of a failed state marked with chaos, civil war, absence
of law and order and deteriorating humanitarian and economic conditions. Any state
consists of three basic elements: people, land, and a sovereign political authority. Somalia
seems to be missing the third element. As a result, Somalia has no army, police or even a
justice system. The Somali TFG minister of information has announced that the buildings
of the new ministries of defense and ministry of interior would be accomplished within a
year. Although the building would be soon done, improving security on the ground has a
long way to go. Indeed, absence of effective government has serious implications on
Somalia and its people.
Somalia’s sovereignty has been infringed upon in different ways. Firstly, many
reports indicate that Somalia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and territorial waters has
been subject to illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing by Asian and European
commercial vessels. It was estimated that up to 700 foreign vessels- some of them armedconduct unlicensed fishing off Somalia. 20 Accordingly, ―over "$300 million worth of
tuna, shrimp and lobster are stolen every year, by illegal trawlers that fish off the Somali

18

Id.
Alan Taylor, Fighting for Control of Somalia, Poston: The Big Picture, May 29, 2009,
http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2009/05/fighting_for_control_of_somali.html
20
Douglas Guilfoyle, Piracy Off Somalia: UN Security Council Resolution1816 and IMO Regional
Counter-Piracy Efforts, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol 57, July, 2008 pp 690–699, at
692.
19
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coasts.‖21 This inflicts harm on coastal communities and their livelihood. Overfishing
resulting from illegal fishing threatens Somalia’s natural fishing resources and negatively
affects Somalia’s economy. 22 International community has failed to address this problem
and have totally ignored it. Despite the fact that this illegal activity has been going on for
seventeen years and despite the awareness of the international community, no action has
been taken to stop it.23
Another serious violation of Somalia Sovereignty was revealed by chance. The huge
waves of the tsunami that hit northern Somalia have revealed a secret that was buried in
the sea. The massive tsunami brought with it tons of nuclear and toxic waste illegally
dumped along the coast off Somalia. Nick Nuttal, the spokesman for the United Nations
Environment Program (UNEP), said ―Initial reports indicate that the tsunami waves broke
open containers full of toxic waste and scattered the contents.‖24 Mr. Nuttal added that
―Somalia has been used as a dumping ground for hazardous waste starting since 1990s
and counting through the civil war there.‖ 25 European companies were accused of
illegally dumping nuclear waste off Somalia, such as, ―[the] Swiss firm, Achair Partners,
and an Italian waste broker, Progresso.26 Consequently, many Somalis living in towns on
the Indian Ocean coast suffer from radiation sickness, such as ―respiratory infections,
mouth ulcers and bleeding, abdominal haemorrhages and unusual skin infections .”27
However, no serious investigation has been opened on this subject matter. Both the cases
of illegal fishing and the dumping of toxic waste off the coast of Somalia have created a
deep feeling of injustice among Somali people especially communities live near by the
21

Saeed Shabazz, Pirates Abound, The Amsterdam News, Vol. 100 No. 16 April 16-22, 2009, at 1.
See Also, Review of Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing on Developing Countries
Synthesis Report, Marine Resources Assessment Group Ltd, July 2005, (showing that IUU fishing cause
direct loss of the value of the catches, loss to GNP, loss of lading fees, license fees, and other levies
payable for legal fishing operators; while indirect impact of IUU includes loss of income, and employment
in other industries and activities such as fishing equipment, boats and fish processing, packaging, and
transport).
23
International Expert Group on Piracy Off The Somali Coast: Workshop Commissioned by The Special
Representatives of the Secretary General of UN to Somalia Ambassador Ahmedou Ould‐Abdallah (2008).
24
Jonathan Clayton, Somalia's secret dumps of toxic waste washed ashore by tsunami, Times Online,
World News, March 4, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article418665.
25
Alisha Raya, Waste Dumping Off Somalia Coast May Have links to Mafia, Somali Warlords, Voice of
America, The Environment in the News, United Nation Environment Program, March 16, 2005.
26
Id. (European companies found it to be very cheap to get rid of waste there, costing as little as $2.50 per
ton where disposal costs in Europe amount to $250 a ton).
27
Id.
22
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coast. The chairman of Somalia Concern Group, Mohamed Gure, has warned that
―Somali coastline used to sustain hhundreds of thousands of people, as a source of food
and livelihoods.‖28
In addition to the above, Somali people are living an ongoing tragedy, a mix of
natural and man-made disasters.

USAID last Situation Report calls it: a ―complex

emergency: widespread violence, endemic poverty, recurrent draughts, and floods.‖29
Recently, the World Food Program (WFP) suspended food distribution in Somalia
because of insecurity; this decision has a direct impact on half of Somalia’s population
dependant on humanitarian aid.30 Therefore, millions of Somali people, especially
children with malnutrition, are facing starvation. Somalia is one of the poorest countries
in the world, ranked 161 of 163 on the UNDP’s Human Development Index. 31 Health
indicators are among the worst in Africa; the life expectancy is 47 years. 32 Thousands of
Somalis try to escape their harsh realities through illegal human trafficking. UN officials
said that ―nearly 30,000 Somalis and Ethiopians came ashore in Yemen in 2007; about
700 bodies washed up, some gnawed by sharks and another 700 people went missing.‖33
There are 1.3 million internally displaced persons in Somalia with 400,000 refugees in
other countries.34 The continued humanitarian crisis in Somalia pushed a UN official to
declare that ―the situation is severe. It is the most pressing humanitarian emergency in the
world today- even worse than Darfur.‖ 35

28

Najad Abdullahi, Toxic Waste Behind Somali Piracy, Aljazeera: News Africa, Oct. 11, 2008,
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2008/10/2008109174223218644.html
29
Somalia: Complex Emergency, USAID, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance
(DCHA) & Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Situation Report No.8 (2009).
30
Frank Nyakairu, Children Hit Hardest After WFP Suspends Work in Southern Somalia, Reuters, Jan. 5,
2010, http://www.alertnet.org/db/an_art/55866/2010/00/5-162826-1.htm (According to UNICEF, 40
percent of children in Somalia show signs of chronic nutritional deprivation).
31
Somalia: Country Brief, World Bank, Aug. 2009,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ AFRICA
EXT/SOMALIAEXTN/0,,menuPK:367675~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:367665,00.html
32
Id.
33
Yemen Better Than Somalia, News24, March 5, 200, http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Yemenbetter-than-Somalia-20080228 (Reports estimate 700,000 Somalis living in Yemen. The paradox is that
Yemen is the poorest Arab Country, but still for many Somalis is better than misery and danger at home.
Many Somali use Yemen as a getaway to other countries).
34
Shabazz, supra note 18, at 1.
35
Emma Batha, Somalia is Worst Humanitarian Crisis, UN Official, Reuters, Jan. 30, 2008,
http://www.alertnet.org/db/an_art/1564/2008/00/30-152422-1.htm.(Unlike Darfur, whereas the suffering is
eased by a billion-dollar aid operation and more than 10,000 workers, Somalia is still consider a no go
zone. UN officials estimate that the total emergency aid for Somalia is less than $ 200 million), See,
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1.Factors Behind Emergence of Modern Piracy and Spread of Piracy in Somalia:
This lengthy background of Somalia is a necessary and integral part of the paper in
order to grasp the broader picture surrounding Somali piracy. It is now less surprising
that piracy has taken root in Somalia. It is crystal clear that certain features of Somalia
have made piracy possible. Nonetheless, this background is not attempt to come up with a
theory to explain Somali piracy, but rather an attempt to highlight a number of factors
which have contributed to the spread of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Before analyzing
Somali piracy, it is important to explore literature of piracy.
Piracy: Past and Present
It is crucial to contrast Somali piracy with piracy on other regions through out history,
in order to see how modern piracy has evolved over years. Looking back to history of
piracy offers valuable lessons on countering piracy and distinguishes between different
types of pirates.
History reveals two contrasted forms of piracy, a heroic form and a disgracful one:
privateering and piracy. The first was authorized by the state, by letters of marque and
reprisal, to raid the ships of declared enemies. Further, the licensor state receives a
percentage of its privateers’ gains. In the other hand, pirates were not loyal to any state.
Thus, they used to attack all ships indiscriminately for their own gain. A heroic welcome
was waiting for privateers, while harsh punishment was directed toward pirates. The line
between glory and disgrace was very thin. 36
Throughout the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, privateers and pirates were a
major threat, especially in the Americas. During Spanish exploration and colonization,
treasure fleets, which were sent to the new world to bring treasures and precious metals,
were subject to attacks from pirates and privateers. Therefore, the governments of
American colonies attempted to suppress both piracy and privateering.37
However, with the end of colonization, a reduction of naval presence was noticed in
regions where piracy had historically flourished. Moreover, after the Cold War, most

Jeffery Gettleman, Somalia Worst Humaniterinan Crisis in Africa, UN Says, The New York Times, Nov.
19, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/20/world/africa/20iht-20somalia.8399453.html?_r=1.
36
The Privateers: Pirates or Soliders, History of Piracy, http://www.thewayofthepirates.com/history-ofpiracy/privateers.php.
37
Military: Pirates, Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/pirates.htm.
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countries have reduced their naval forces. 38 Currently, the volume of merchant ships has
significantly increased, carrying high-value cargos with small unarmed crews. Therefore,
the level of vulnerability is high. This has paved the way for the re-emergence of modern
piracy. Modern piracy of the 1990s has special features which distinguish it from the
more traditional piracy. Modern piracy has witnessed a new level of professional
organization. Piracy evolved into a more organized form of crime, with a high level of
sophistication using hi-technology. Piracy has become a sophisticated criminal enterprise,
including intelligence gathering, ransom negotiations, and multiple coordinated hijack
operations. 39
Modern piracy can be seen as post-colonial type of piracy which benefited from the
vacuum of power resulted from the withdraw of colonial naval presence from its former
colonies. Somali piracy seems to fall within this category. During the 19th century,
Italians, French and British controlled the Horn of Africa. The British Royal Navy used
to have a residence in Aden, due to the proximity of imperial India. Britain continued its
control of the Somali coastline and the Gulf of Aden, while governing its formal
protectorate of Somaliland. Britain asserted its presence in the region till the birth of the
new Somali Republic in 1960. In the following period, a small Somali maritime force had
attempted to control Somali strategic waters till the regime was collapsed in 1991; Somali
ports were closed to foreign vessels in 1995. 40
The emergence of piracy indicates the struggle of infant states in controlling their
vast waters. It is a difficult task for the new newly established states, especially
developing countries, to fill the vacuum of power left by colonial navies. Strong navies
with superior technical support are required to ensure control over territorial waters of
independent states. While the number of independent states continued to increase during
1950s to 1960s, the new states raised claims over the limits of national jurisdiction and
upon exploiting natural resources beyond their territorial waters. This has paved to way
toward a new maritime framework which was designed to cope with new structural
changes in world system. Those endeavors have resulted upon the new United Nations
38

Id.
The Profits of Piracy Soar, The Middle East, 47, 47-50 Nov. 2008.
40
Gary E. Weir, Fish, Family and Profit: Piracy and the Gulf of Aden,62 Naval War College Review, 15,
15-28 (2009)
39
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Convention of the Sea (UNCLS) in 1982, which is considered as ―constitution of the
oceans.‖41 However, the problem of inability of developing countries to control its waters
remains unsolved. Piracy incidents continues to be concentrated in ―areas with little or no
maritime law enforcement, political and economic instability, and high volume of
commercial activity.‖42
J. L. Anderson, in his exceptional article: Piracy and World History, has identified a
type of piracy which he termed ―episodic piracy.‖ 43 This type of piracy accompanies the
weakening of political power, either on a regional or local level. For example, in the
seventeenth century, with the decline of the Iberian, Ottoman, Mughal, and Ming
empires, a surge of piracy spread from the Caribbean to the South China Sea. Disruption
of trade resulted in the unemployment of both seamen and ships, leading those whose
livelihood was derived from maritime activity to seek alternatives, which included
smuggling and piracy. However, when normal levels or patterns of trade were restored,
this type of piracy disappears. 44 Accordingly, the collapse of the central government in
Somalia in 1991 is the defining moment in which the normal pattern of life in Somalia
was disrupted, causing a surge in piracy. It is a simple cause and effect relationship.
Piracy offered an alternative to bankruptcy and starvation. An immediate
consequence of state collapse is the army being dissolved. Hundred of thousands of
militants were discharged, unemployed and with no source of income. Many of them
engaged in clan warfare; others turned to piracy. Well-equipped professional militants
and expert fishermen together made Somali waters the most dangerous waters on earth.
There are socio-economic factors that fuel piracy. Pirates are seen as heroes in
Somalia. This widespread glorification of piracy is a function of a sense of victimhood
and national humiliation in response to illegal fishing and dumping toxic waste.45 Still,
the characteristics of a failed state in Somalia, which expand to include ―sociopolitical
instability, dire economic conditions and crushing poverty,‖46 are responsible for making
41
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piracy pervasive in Somalia. These harsh realities of life in the context of the chaotic
political situation onshore have made piracy flourish at sea.
The final UN report on piracy off the coast of Somalia commissioned by the Special
Representatives of the Secretary General of UN to Somalia concluded that:
Poverty, lack of employment, environmental hardship, pitifully low incomes,
reduction of pastoralist and maritime resources due to drought and illegal fishing
and a volatile security and political situation all contribute to the rise and
continuance of piracy in Somalia. This situation will remain so until there is an
effective and simultaneous action taken against the pirate trade and an alternative
means of income support mechanism implemented to replace it; otherwise
criminal activity, in some shape or form, will continue to take priority as a means
of generating income among the armed militias of Somalia. 47
Determining the factors behind Somali piracy is the first step toward finding a
permanent solution to piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Therefore, it is crucial to firstly identify
the problem before moving to the next step which is solving the problem. Thus, any antipiracy measures have to respond to the roots of the problem in order to guarantee their
effectiveness in the long-term. In this regards, an essential question has to be answered:
What makes a pirate? What turn an ordinary person into a vicious pirate?
Somali pirates are a mix of ex-fishermen and ex-militants. Fishermen are turned into
pirates because they could not sustain their livelihood due to illegal fishing, and nuclear
waste dumping which have harmed their communities and natural fishing resources. On
the other hand, ex-militants join piracy as a response to the state collapse, and absence of
alternative income after losing their jobs in the former Somali army or police force.
In the final analysis, I would argue that there are two set of factors contributing to
Somali piracy: factors relating to Somalia in general and factors relating to coastal
Somali communities specifically. The first set of factors feeding piracy is the current
chaotic political situation which is marked by an ineffective central government, civil
war, and tribal welfare. The second set of factors contributing to piracy originates from
Somali coastal communities, the breeding ground of pirates. What drives coastal
communities toward piracy are illegal fishing, nuclear waste dumping, and poverty.
Consequently, anti-piracy measures have to respond to those two sets of factors feeding
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piracy in Somalia. Before the situation can be resolved, international and regional antipiracy efforts will continue to be misguided and surely ineffective.
B. Somali Pirates:
Piracy in Somalia was not a big issue before 1990; recognizing only minor incidents
of armed robbery against few small fishing crafts. By the mid 1990s, a more structured
form of piracy began to take place when armed groups, claiming they were authorized to
be coast guards responsible for protecting Somali fishing resources, began to attack
vessels illegally fishing in their territorial waters and held them for ransom. Since 2005,
this practice has continued against any ship that sails within or close to Somali territorial
waters. By 2005, attacks of Somali pirates intensified in the Indian Ocean off the cost of
Somalia. In 2006, pirates extended their theater of operations as far as 350 nautical miles
off the cost of Somalia, targeting the Gulf of Aden and the mouth of the Red Sea. A surge
in pirate attacks during 2008 made Somali waters the most dangerous waters in the
world.48 By 2008, the international community had started to react to the threat of piracy
in the Gulf of Aden in a coordinated, dedicated manner launching the biggest anti-piracy
mission in modern history.49
1. Bases & Main Groups
While Somali pirates groups are formed largely on clan or sub-clan lines, but they
still sometimes recruit members of other clans for their particular skills. 50 Most of the
pirates are young in age between 20 and 35. A pirate gang can consist of 62 men, as in
the case of MV Faina. 51 Somali pirates consist of warlords and former fishermen. This
alliance between warlords and former fishermen has proven to be powerful. In this
alliance, warlords are the muscle providing arms and ammunitions, and skilled armed
men; while fishermen are the brains with their knowledge of the sea and ability to pilot
speed boats and ships. Also, pirate gangs include technical experts who use high-tech
equipment such as satellite phones, GPS and military hardware. Therefore, a Somali gang
48
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consists of brains, muscles and computer geeks: ex-fishermen, ex-militants, and technical
experts.52
There are five main active pirate groups spreading along the long coast of Somalia:
groups from the Darood clan, are active in coastal towns: Eyl, Garad, and Hobyo; pirate
groups, from Hawaiye clan, are active in coastal towns in Hardaheere and Mogadishu.53
Puntland is the most important base for Somali pirates. Puntland is the epicenter of piracy
where piracy penetrates all levels of society even governmental officials of Puntland. 54
The East African Seafarers' Association estimates that these five pirate gangs have a total
of 1,000 armed men and unlimited supply of unemployed young men who are willing to
be pirates.55 For many pirates, piracy is not lucrative a business but rather a means of
survival.
The most interesting feature of Somali pirates is that they see themselves as
coastguards as it appears on names of main pirate groups. For example, one Pirate group
is called The National Volunteer Coast Guard (NVCG) which is only targeting fishing
vessels and small boats in the area around Kismaya on the northern coast. Another groups
is called The Marka Group named upon the town of Marka from where they operate;
similar to Puntland Group operating around Puntland. The most powerful sophisticated
Somali pirate group is known as The Somali Marines which has a fleet admiral, vice
admiral and head of financial operations.56 Another alarming feature of Somali pirates
that they are expanding by time and building up in terms of military capabilities and
resource bases; piracy become a powerful rival institution to the Somali government. 57
2. Tactics
Somali pirates’ hijacking techniques have evolved over time. Their successful record
of high profile attacks reveals their advanced level of organization. No type of vessel is
immune from pirates attack. Although there are five separate pirate groups operating in
different regions, they all use the same tactics. Therefore, many believe that these pirates
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follow a code of procedures similar to modern navies. Their sophisticated types of attacks
are worth noting.
If the target vessel is within the territorial water or nearby, Somali pirates will use
speedboats. Around six speedboats, each loaded with six to ten armed men, will surround
the target from all sides. If the captain refused to surrender, they would fire alarming
shoots from their automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenade (RPG); while one of
their boats will move toward the ship unnoticed where pirates will gain access using
grappling hooks and irons to climb aboard. Then they overtake and put all the hostages in
one place and order the captain to sail toward Somali waters, usually toward Eye Port, the
headquarters for pirates. Hostages are kept safe, till ransom is paid.58
If the target vessel sails in international waters far awary from Somali waters, Somali
pirates use the phantom ship technique. They launch their operation from a mother ship
or ―phantom ship,‖ an ordinary ship which seems non-threatening. Mother ships are
usually larger fishing vessels which were previously captured and whose owners refused
to pay ransom to free them59 Pirates reuse these ships in their piratical operation as the
mother ship. They load their speedboats, arms, food, and fuel onto their mother ship. In
Most of the cases, the mother ships are fishing vessels from neighboring states such as
Yemen and Egypt. The original crew of the mother ship is asked to act normally, while
pirates on board try to identify any vessels passing by. Once the target is identified, six
speedboats are launched immediately from the mother ship to attack the target. This
technique in hijacking ships has enabled Somali pirates to attack ships far away from
Somalia.60 This technique is swift and surprising. Captains realize that they are under
attack late. The average time for a pirate attack is fifteen to thirty minutes.61 It is
extremely difficult to distinguish a pirate mother ship from any ordinary ship since
pirates’ mother ship does not carry the Somali flag.
Unlike pirates in other parts of the world, Somali pirates do not steal the hijacked ship
and its cargo. Somali pirates create hostage situations. They ask the owner of the hijacked
vessel to pay ransom in exchange for the ship and its crew. Once ransom is delivered, the
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crew and their ship are released. Somali pirates are known for taking care of their
hostages to ensure ransom is paid. Another distinctive feature of Somali piracy is that
pirates do not try to hide the hijacked ships; they sail openly toward the Somalia coast.
Pirates either keep the hostages in their ship near the Somali coast or take them ashore till
ransom is paid. It is estimated that pirates gained $ 150 million of ransom payments in
2008.62
E. Somali pirates Side of the story
How little we know about pirates themselves! Analysts, observers, and commentators
warn us of their threat to maritime security. The personal side of the pirates is not
presented. For pirates elsewhere, famous captains and their stories are publically known.
None of the Somali pirate captains are widely known. May be Somali pirates are ordinary
youth. However, a few rare interviews with Somali pirates have managed to bring
pirates’ perspective into the surface.
The questions of the following interview were sent to a Somali journalist who
managed to conduct this interview with one of the Somali pirates, named Said who based
in Gu’ard. This interview reveals how pirates see themselves and offers inside
information on their tactics, organization, and ransom arrangements. The purpose of the
interview is to fairly represent pirates’ perspective in the subject. By the way, the full
interview was republished on online website.63
How did you become a pirate?
Saaid: I was a fisherman in Gar'ad, a coastal village in Somalia’s Mudug region, before I turned into a
coast guard. We decided to counter illegal fishing along our coastlines ourselves, and to protect our
resources from foreign looters who destroyed our fishing equipment.
Illegal foreign fishing vessels have taken all the fish, big and small. Nothing was left for us. They even
fished about 2 to 3 miles near our coastlines. At that time, we only had AK-47, assault rifles, and other
small weapons but we had more skiffs. We used to attack one foreign fishing ships by 200 skiffs, while
each skiff carries onboard 3 pirates armed with AK-47. No one was supporting us financially at that time.
Also, we have seen foreign ships dumping toxic waste nearby our shore, resulting in the death of fish and
affecting the health of many coastal villagers. Therefore, we decided to capture the vessels before they
dump toxic waste in our sea.
What are the tactics you use to hijack ships?
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Saaid: A big boat (mother ship) and two small high-speed boats will go together. Each small boat carries
five pirates armed with Rocket Propel Grenades (RPGs) and sophisticated GPS and AIS (Automated
Information Systems).
When we receive a signal of a cargo ship transiting nearby, we set our perimeters and launch the attack
from the two skiffs while the mother ship backs us.
We chase the target, firing weapons at the captain’s mast; some captains give up, while others speed off.
Those we seize; we order the captain of the vessel to send signal informing the nearby forces that we are
onboard. Then, the vessel changes its direction and sail towards Somali coast.
How do you deal with the hostages? Do you strip them of personal properties?
Saaid: We have a code of conduct that outlines how we will deal with the hostages, we respect the
hostages. We don't touch their personal properties or the cargo of the hijacked ship. We don’t rope them
and ask them ransom but we deal with the owner of the seized ship. Our aim is to get money and we only
deal with the ship owner.
How is the ransom delivered to you?
Saaid: The ransom money reaches us in two ways. First, we are not connected to any port; our station is
where we operate. A warship from the country that owns the ship delivers the money if the money is more
than $1.5 million. If the money is less than $ 1.5 million, we use other ways including money transfer
systems locally known as Hawala.
And how is it divided?
Saaid: The gentle pirates who captured the vessel take 50%, and the groups which provided financial
support take 40%, and the rest 10% is for the guards who stay with the hijacked ship at the coast and the
people who work with us until we get the ransom.
What if a ship owner refused to pay ransom?
Saaid: We do two things if the owners refused to pay ransom for their seized ships. We move the ship's
crew to the shore including the captain until the owner pay the ransom which we demanded. If not, we use
the ship to hijack other ships.
Who funds your piracy operations?
Saaid: Most of the pirates are young men; nobody really finances our operations; we have umbrella groups
which do everything we need including financing our operations.
From where do you get your weapons?
Saaid: Somalia has weapons from all the world. We get weapons from inside and from outside the country;
mostly we buy from our neighboring countries illegally.
Any country in particular?
Saaid: Yemeni illegal arm dealers supply us.
What is the most dangerous situation you have ever faced while in a piracy operation?
Saaid: We were nine of us on a boat seafaring more than a thousand miles off Somalia over a month and
three days. We were unlucky and decided to return to shores but some 120 miles off the shorelines, we
encountered one of the worst tragedies.
We saw a cloud of dust whirling and scores of high-tweeting birds flying over the waters. All over the
sudden, the waters became so rough and the boat was half sunk. Only one of us, who was on the lower part
of the boat, remained onboard. He was the one who could rescue us.
Later, we have discovered that the dust was caused by a toxic waste dumped by a ship that immediately
fled the area.

17

How do pirates manage to deal with warships patrolling Somali waters?
Saaid: The warships are here to fight, so we are prepared all the time for it. Nevertheless, when we
encounter them in the high seas, some of us send their weapons overboard and claim that they are illegal
immigrants.
Others will decide to fight them and the mighty will prevail; while other groups will simply decide to flee.
If they were in three boats, they will divide themselves and start fleeing in three different directions. The
forces will go after one boat and the rest will escape.
Do you have one leader or each group has its own leader? Is there a form of coordination between
Somali pirates?
Saaid: The pirates belong to different groups, but we have umbrella groups. There are two main groups;
one in Puntland and the other in south and central Somalia. I am a member of the one in Puntland.
We stay in contact and we respect each other. For example, when a group of pirates in Gar'ad takes ransom
they will share it with their friends in south and central Somalia and vice versa.
IOL: Do pirates have a network of intelligence in ports around Somalia such as in Yemen or Kenya?
Saaid: No, we don't have any link with the ports around Somalia. We reach only the border near Kenya and
back to our positions in Somalia.. But, we reach secretly to the coasts of Yemen to buy high-speed boats
and arms illegally.
IOL: Do you think piracy will end here one day? And when?
Saaid: Piracy will end when the government of Somalia restores law and order; when the world really
wants to protect the Somali waters and stops dumping toxic waste and leave the coast of Somalia.
I mean you can't pretend to correct things on the land while you destroy the sea. Multinational warships
must leave the Somali waters. Otherwise, piracy will remain forever.

3. Current Situation
Pirates are more dangerous than ever. World navies have failed to deter them. Recent
statistics are very alarming. The first 9 months of 2009 have shown that the Somali
pirates expanded their operation from Gulf of Aden and the east Coast of Somalia to the
southern part of the Read Sea, the Bab el Mandab Straits and the east coast of Oman.
International Maritime Bureau announced that year 2009 witnessed unprecedented
increase of pirate activity off Somali coast. Somali pirates are responsible for a total of
168 incidents reported in the first nine months 2009,64 with a total of 533 crew members
have been hostages,65 accounting for more than the half of reported attacks.66 . The rate of
pirate attacks doubled in the last three months of September to November 2009. 67 The
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accelerating pace of pirate attacks continued in 2010. According to EU naval force there
was nine hijackings in March 2010 alone.68
The next chapter explores the legal framework governing piracy. This is followed
by discussion anti-piracy measures against Somali pirates.

68
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II. Piracy and International Law
For centuries, seas and oceans were loosely governed. Since the seventeenth century,
the concept of freedom of the seas was the dominant rule; whereas national rights only
extend to the narrow belt of waters from state’s coastline. It was three miles, a range of a
canon at that time. Waters behind it were regarded high seas; belonging to no one,
whereas all states enjoyed freedom of navigation. High seas are ―res communis, or the
common property to all nations.‖ 69 Only in the early twentieth century, United Nations
Convention on The Law of the Sea (UNCLS) have replaced the concept of freedom of
the sea and designed a comprehensive legal framework with more than 400 articles.70 It
determined territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, and international waters.71
The High Seas Convention and United Nation Convention on The Law of the Sea
(UNCLS) set the legal framework for tackling piracy. It identifies piracy, states’ duties in
the repression of piracy and the seizure procedures of a pirate ship. The effectiveness of
UNCLS legal framework in tackling Somali piracy is addressed in chapter four. This
chapter explores the legal framework applicable to maritime piracy, focusing on legal
definition, states’ obligations, and tradition anti-piracy measures. Difficulties of
enforcement are sufficiently addressed, as piracy continues to contest the legal
framework governing seas.
A. Legal definition
The legal definition of piracy is crucial in identifying acts which constitute the
crime of piracy. Piracy is one of the oldest crimes. The crime of piracy is a well-known
example of a crime relating to pre-existing customary international law. For over two
thousand years, world’s nations have regarded pirates as enemies of the human race
―hostes humani generis.‖72 The High Seas Convention of 1958 and the UN Convention
on The Law of the Sea of 1982 codified those rules into a treaty law. The codified
definition of piracy is ―generally, thought not universally, accepted‖ as codified
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customary international law. UNCLS defines piracy in article 101 as any of the following
acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends
by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board
such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of
facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).73

Although this article defines acts of piracy committed by private ship, piracy can be
also committed by a warship or government ship, whose crew has mutinied and taken
control of the ship. In this case, their acts would be assimilated to acts committed by a
private ship.74 That is because the crew, in this instance, is acting on its own. The state
lost control over its warship, while the crew attacks ships for private ends.
The crime of piracy in international law can be committed on international waters,
including the high seas and the exclusive economic zones. If the same acts were
committed within internal waters or territorial sea, those acts would not be a crime of
piracy, but rather a crime of armed robbery against ships, and would be subject to a
nation’s domestic jurisdiction. 75 However, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) has
suggested another definition in an attempt to expand the scope of piracy to ―include
boarding to steal or commit some other crime and the actual and implied use of force by
perpetrators.‖76 Piracy threatens navigational safety regardless of the location, whether
the crime was committed was in the high seas or territorial waters.77 It is questionable
whether a change in the location may change the nature of the crime. The paradox is that
piracy mainly occurs in territorial waters near ports and rarely takes place in international
waters.

73

United Nation Convention on The Law of the Sea art.101, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
Supra, art. 102.
75
James P. Terry, Lawlessness In A Failed State: The Case For Eradicating Piracy In Somalia, Center for
the Study of Democracy, St. Mary’s College of Maryland,
http://www.smcm.edu/democracy/_assets/documents/Lawlessness%20in%20a%20 Failed %20State.pdf
76
Craig J. Forsyth, ET AL., Waterborne Crime: Examining contemporary Piracy, Deviant Behavior, 30:
669–679, 2009.
77
Id, at 672.
74

21

The convention of the Sea stresses on the element of private purpose ―animus furandi‖
in the crime of piracy to be distinguished form political activity. 78 However, this
definition does not exclude politically motivated violence. It basically means that
violence is not public. Pirates are acting not on behalf of their states but rather for their
private interests. The words of ―for private ends‖ was originally included to the definition
of piracy to ―acknowledge the historical exception of civil war insurgencies who attacked
only the vessels of the government they sought to overthrow.‖79 However, many state’s
officials at all levels, throughout history, have profited and secretly sponsored acts of
piracy. 80 Thus, giving a blind eye and taking no active measures toward pirates raises
doubts about state responsibility.
On the other hand, piracy might be socially accepted in a number of societies and an
entire coastal community’s economy might be based on piracy. Eradication of piracy in
this instance would be hard. Law is not targeting criminal individuals but rather
communities. It is problematic when piracy becomes a basic activity for survival. Also,
piracy becomes more complex in the case of a state claim of a historical right and
authority to tax nearby shipping lanes. Conflicting claims of state authority over
historical waters is a challenge. In this case, can state actions of arresting and detaining
crew and confiscating boats in its historical waters be regarded as piracy?
B. States’ obligations in the repression of piracy
Fighting piracy requires a well-coordinated response. That is because the crime of
piracy takes place on the high seas, outside all state’s jurisdiction targeting foreign
vessels. The overwhelming international dimensions of the crime require an international
coordination.
Therefore, all state are under legal duty to fully cooperate to the fullest possible extent in
the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of
any state.81 Both the High Seas Convention and UN Convention on The Law of the Sea
stressed the importance of cooperation in fighting piracy. That is because piracy is an
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international crime which threatens the security and safety of navigations in the high seas.
No single country, regardless of its naval power, can unilaterally suppress piracy.
Coordinated efforts are a must.
International law did not elaborate upon the nature or level of cooperation. A regional
form of cooperation between coastal states is very effective in suppressing piracy.
International organizations, such as International Maritime Organization (IMO), play a
key role in coordinating international efforts in fighting piracy on the high seas.
Therefore, there are multiple levels of coordination from regional level to the
international level or military verses civilian cooperation.
C. Traditional Anti-Piracy Measures in International Law
International law specifies certain rules of engagement to be followed by warships in
capturing and prosecution of pirates. This section is particularly important in determining
the effectiveness of legal framework in tackling piracy. Then, problems arise from legal
framework is foll0wed.
International law allows the seizure of a pirate ship and the arrest of pirates on board.
To begin with, UN Convention on The Law of the Sea defined a pirate ship as:
A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if it is intended by the persons
in dominant control to be used for the purpose of committing one of the acts referred
to in article 101. The same applies if the ship or aircraft has been used to commit any
such act, so long as it remains under the control of the persons guilty of that act.82
According to article 105 of UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, once a pirate ship is
identified, every state may seize a pirate ship or a ship taken by piracy and under the
control of pirates. Nonetheless, the seizure of a pirate ship must be done on the high seas.
Therefore, any state can seize a pirate ship on high seas and arrest the persons and seize
the property on board. In this regard, the courts of the state which carried out the seizure
may try them and determine the action to be taken with regard to ships, and property on
board. However, this would be subject to the rights of the third parties acting in a good
faith.83
A seizure of a pirate ship is only authorized to be carried out by warships or ―other
ships clearly marked and identified as being in government service and authorized to that
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effect.‖84 Therefore, any state warship or government vessel may board a ship suspect of
piracy as an exception to the otherwise exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state. 85 However,
if ―the seizure of a ship on suspicion of piracy has been effected without adequate
grounds, the state making the seizure shall be liable for any loss or damage caused by the
seizure.‖86In addition, any state under international customary law can persecute a pirate
found within its territory, as an exercise of universal jurisdiction. 87
D. Difficulties of Enforcement
Common difficulties are associated with the enforcement of international law in
regards to piracy. Firstly, prosecuting pirates is a challenging task because pirate attacks
occur outside the territorial waters of any state. The enforcement jurisdiction granted to
all states to purse pirate ships in international waters does not extend to the territorial sea
of any state. In traditional cases of hot pursuit, pursuit must cease ―as soon as the ship
pursued enters the territorial sea of its own [flag] state or a third state.‖88 Pirates’ ability
to escape pursuit by crossing into territorial waters remains a serious challenge to efforts
to suppress piracy.
The second difficulty in prosecuting pirates is that pirates tend to ―seek a sanctuary in
countries whose judicial system is ill equipped to prosecute them.‖89 Pirates seek refugee
on remote islands or in countries with weak governments. Most developing countries
overlooking the sea are not well-equipped to protect their waters which require wellstationed naval forces with sufficient technical support. Therefore, rogue states waters are
loosely governed, if governed at all. Consequently, the High Seas Convention and
UNCLS lack enforcement in such instances. Actually, the UNCLS desperately calls on
developed countries to provide assistant to developing countries in protecting their
waters. However, those calls are met with silence. Thus, prosecuting pirates in such
circumstances is a real challenge.
A third problem in prosecuting pirates is the absence of national legislation
criminalizing piracy in most countries. Indeed, very few countries have ratified laws
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attacking the problem. 90 Despite the fact that piracy is an internationally recognized
crime, states’ national legislation is a step behind. And internal laws do not fully
incorporate the crime of piracy. Since there are no international tribunals for pirates, they
are placed on trail in front of a national court. The absence of national laws on piracy
constrains local courts’ ability to prosecute pirates. Even countries which have legal
grounds to prosecute pirates are not always keen and willing to do so.
The lack of evidence is another serious challenge in prosecuting pirates. Pirates tend
to drop their weapons on the sea before their arrest which frustrate possible legal actions
taken against them.. Witnesses, on the other hand, are on the move and very reluctant to
engage in a long journey of prosecution and subsequent trials.
Another common problem of enforcement rises when piracy, although illegal, is
sometimes socially accepted practice with a community. Indeed, piracy is an accepted
aspect of the culture in Southeast Asia and Africa and other parts of the world. In this
regard, piracy is a source of supplemental income and means of survival. 91 Therefore, it
is extremely difficult to prosecute an entire community. And individual arrest of pirates is
ofthen pointless.
In the final analysis, international law is very brief and ―has little to say about the
manner, in which piracy may be suppressed.‖ 92 Rules of engagement governing the
conduct of suppressing piracy on the high seas remain ―embryonic, found in a limited
case law and inferences from treaties.‖93 Still, any use of force in suppressing acts of
piracy must be ―necessary, proportionate, and should be proceeded by warning shots
where practicable.‖94
The legal framework applicable to the crime of piracy has to be re-examined. Piracy
poses a difficult test for the current international legal system governing seas. The shaky
maritime legal foundation creates a fragile security on the high seas, threatening maritime
navigation.
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IV. Measures against Somali Piracy
In the wake of the unprecedented upsurge of pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden in
2008, the global shipping industry and its insurance companies have called on
governments to take immediate action to suppress piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Indian
Ocean.95The international community reacted quickly to the danger of piracy given the
region’s strategic location. 96 Right now, ―the Gulf of Aden is currently being patrolled
by one of the largest anti-piracy flotillas in modern history.‖97 This chapter explores
international and regional efforts taken to counter Somali piracy.
A. International Measures
The unprecedented threat of Somali pirates on international trade and freedom of
navigation in the strategic area of Gulf of Aden have provoked a decisive international
response. The repeated attacks on vessels of Word Food Program have induced United
Nations to alarm international community of the growing piracy off the Somali coast. The
growing number of victims of Somali pirates from crew members, ship owners, and
insurance companies, had pressured their government to take active measure to put and
end to piracy. The international community decisively responded by deploying the
biggest modern anti-piracy mission under United Nations new mandate which unleashed
naval warship to take all necessary means to pursue, arrest and prosecute pirates.
1. United Nations Security Council
The Security Council has played an active role in fighting Somali piracy. A series of
resolutions have been dedicated to tackling Somali piracy apart form Somalia’s ongoing
situation. Resolution 1816 of June 2008 authorized states acting in cooperation with and
with prior notification of the TFG to:
(a) Enter the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy
and armed robbery at sea, in a manner consistent with such action permitted on the
high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international law; and
(b) Use, within the territorial waters of Somalia, in a manner consistent with action
permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international law,
all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery. 98
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This was a proactive stance in fighting piracy. For the first time, a state warship can
suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery not only on the international waters, but also in
the territorial waters of Somalia. This only requires the permission of the Somali
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its notification of the UN Secretary General.
The initial authorization lasted for six months from June 2008. The absence of effective
coast guards, police, and efficient judicial system in Somalia encouraged the Security
Council to adopt such unprecedented resolution acting under Chapter VII of the Charter
of the United Nations. This resolution was passed with Somalia’s consent.99 However,
this resolution is contrary to states’ obligations under the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea and High Seas Convention. That is why the resolution affirms that the
authorization to enter the territorial water of a state applies only with respect to Somalia
and ―shall not affect the right or obligations, or responsibilities of member states under
international law…and shall not be considered as establishing customary international
law.‖100 Thus, the authorization was exceptional to the case of Somalia.
In addition, resolution 1816 leave the choice of jurisdiction to be determined by the
concerned states and list possible jurisdictions such as ―flag, port, and costal states, state
of the nationality of victims or perpetrators and other states with relevant jurisdiction and
international law and national legislation.‖ 101
Subsequent Security Council Resolution 1838, adopted on the 7th of Oct. 2008 called
on all states in the region to deploy their naval vessels to participate in the fight against
piracy on the high seas off the coast of Somalia. 102 This resolution urged states to
continue to help protect the World Food maritime convoys.103
Another Security Council Resolution 1846 extended the mandate established in
Resolution 1816 to enter Somali territorial waters and the use of all necessary means to
repress acts of piracy and armed robbery. Resolution 1846 extended this mandate for
another period of twelve months.104
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On the 16th of December 2008, UN Security Council adopted Resolution 151 inviting
states fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia to conclude a special agreement or
arrangements with countries willing to take custody of pirates in order to embark law
enforcement officials (―shipriders‖) from the latter countries, in particular countries in the
region, to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of persons detained.105 In actuality,
most pirates arrested by navel vessels were delivered to Somalia’s neighboring countries,
mainly Kenya and Yemen. It seems that the UN seeks an official arrangement in this
respect, after serious doubts were raised about the judicial capacity of those two states.
Another key issue Resolution 1851 touched upon is the importance of establishing a
cooperation mechanism between states fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia to form a
regional center to coordinate information and increase regional capacity.106
As a result, a multilateral Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS)
made up of 24 member governments and five regional and international organizations
was formed based on Resolution 1851. In January 2009, the contact group’s first meeting
was held. The main goal of the Contact group is to ―improve operational coordination,
information sharing, and the effectiveness of legal enforcement activities among all
regional and international actors combating piracy in the region.‖ 107The latest meeting of
the CFPRS was held in New York in September 2009, in which a U.N. administrated
trust fund to help to finance the costs assumed by regional states for the prosecution of
piracy suspects.108
The latest Security Council Resolution concerning Somali piracy was adopted in
November 2009, renewing the authorization of states to enter Somali territorial waters to
fight piracy and armed robbery against ships with the permission of the TFG and the
notification of the UN General Secretary. The authorization was renewed for another
twelve months.109 In the Meantime, the Security Council expressed its intention to renew
the authorization for additional periods upon the request of the TFG. The most recent
development was adoption of a new Security Council Resolution 1918, on 27 April 2010,
calling for states especially states in the region to criminalize piracy under their domestic
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law and favorably consider the prosecution of suspected pirates apprehended off the coast
of Somalia. Most importantly, the Secretary-General was asked to present a report on
possible options for creating special domestic chambers possibly with international
components, a regional tribunal or an international tribunal and corresponding
imprisonment arrangements taking into account the existing practice in establishing
international and mixed tribunals and the time and resources necessary to achieve and
sustain substantive results.110 Still, the situation is evolving. International efforts to
prevent piracy in Somalia have rapidly developed at an unprecedented pace.
In the final analysis, the long series of resolutions adopted by the Security Council
has focused in three levels; the first is to develop a coordinated response among countries
engaged in fighting piracy in Somalia. The UN succeeded in this respect with the
formation of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). The second
is to encourage states to assist TFG to bring justice to pirates operating in their land. The
third is to support International Maritime Bureau (IMB) to continue to develop and
implement avoidance, evasion, and defensive best practices and guidelines to follow
when under attack or sailing in waters of the Coast off Somalia with coordination with
shipping and insurance industries.111
2. International Anti-Piracy Operations
Somali pirates attracted the biggest modern anti-piracy military operation, given the
number of the countries taking apart and the size of naval presence dedicated to counter
Somali pirates. In this regard, there are three coalitions of naval forces have been
deployed on the Gulf of Aden operating under different umbrellas but unified on one goal
to stop and deter Somali pirate attacks. Besides, individual countries unilaterally sent its
warships to protect vessels carrying their flags passing off Somali waters. Thus, the area
of the Gulf of Aden and surrounding Somali waters experiencing extraordinary military
presence.
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I. Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151)
In January 2009, the United States Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT)
established Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) with the sole mission of conducting
anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the Somali coast in the
Indian Ocean. The CTF-151 composes of naval ships and assets from more than twenty
nations,112 under the US commander Terence Mcknight.113 The CTF-151 consists of
approximately two dozen ships. The command center of CTF-151 is located in Bahrain.
Before the establishment of CTF-151, this area was under the charge of CTF-150 which
has performed counter-terrorism and maritime security operations since 2001. In August
2008, CTF-150 and partner forces established the Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA)
in the Gulf of Aden ―to serve as a dedicated, more secure transit zone for merchant
vessels.‖114 MSPA was effective in reducing Somali pirates’ attacks in the Gulf of Aden
transit zone.
According to United States Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), in the
period of January 2009 to August 2009, CTF-151 ―encountered 527 pirates; 282 of which
were disarmed and released, 235 disarmed and turned over for prosecution, and 10 were
killed.‖115
2. NATO: Operation Ocean Shield
In addition to Combined Task Force 151, NATO deployed its own anti-piracy
operation. In October 2008, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) deployed its
first anti-piracy operation, named Operation Allied Provider, to serve as a temporary
protection force for World Food Program assistance shipments in the Horn of Africa. 116
This operation only lasted for two months, before NATO end it and reassigned the task of
protecting WFP maritime cargos to the European Union’s new naval operation.

In

March 2009, NATO initiated a new anti-piracy mission named Operation Allied
Protector under the command of Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1). The
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mission was to deter, defend against and disrupt pirate activities. In August 2009, NATO
replaced Operation Allied Protector with a new anti-piracy mission, named Operation
Ocean Shield, under the command of Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2). The
new mission of Operation Ocean Shield is to fight piracy and contribute in capacity
building efforts with regional governments. Warships form United Kingdom, Greece,
Italy, Turkey, and US are taking part in Operation Ocean Shield. 117

3. European Union: Operation Atlanta
European Union joined international anti-piracy efforts The European Union
launched its first naval operation, EUNAVFOR Somalia-Operation Atlanta, under the
framework of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Operation
ATALANTA's mission is to: ―provide protection for vessels chartered by the WFP;
provide protection for merchant vessels; employ the necessary measures, including the
use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of piracy and
armed robbery which may be committed in the areas where they are present.‖118 Rear
Admiral Peter Hudson (UK) commands the operation from the Operational Headquarters
at Northwood, United Kingdom. More than twenty vessels and aircraft take part in
EUNAVFOR, i.e. more than 1,800 military personnel. The main EU countries taking part
in the operation are: Netherlands, Spain, Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Sweden,
Belgium and Luxembourg. Non-EU countries which have joined the operation are:
Norway, Croatia and Montenegro. The running costs of the Atlanta Operation amount to
EUR 8.3 millions for the first year shared between EU member states.119
Under Operation Atlanta, military personnel can arrest, detain, and transfer suspects
who may be prosecuted by an EU member state or by Kenya, under an agreement signed
on March 2009, with the EU and Kenyan authorities, or to Seychelles.120 In the period
of August 2009 to January 2010, the number of WFP vessels escorted by Atlanta reached
57 plus 20 escorts for AMISOM.121
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According to the EU, its naval force in the Horn of Africa is a part of a global action
initiative conducted by the EU to tackle the Somali crisis with its political, security and
humanitarian dimensions. On hand, EU supports the African Union military mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) financially, in terms of planning, and capacity building to increase
the efficiency of the Somali police force. On the other hand, the Joint Strategy Paper for
Somalia for 2008-2013 provides an allocation of EUR 215, 8 million under the EC's 10th
European Development Fund (EDF). Further, On 22 and 23 April 2009, the International
Conference in support of the Somali Security Institutions and the AMISOM was held in
Brussels, organized by the UN, the EU and the African Union. Almost USD 213 million
was pledged to help the Somali Transitional Federal Government bring about peace and
stability. 122
4. National Escort
Other countries have deployed their naval forces to the Horn of Africa to take part in
monitoring and anti-piracy ―National Escort system‖ operations. Those countries main
task is to protect vessels carrying their flag passing by the Gulf of Aden. Although those
countries are not operating under CTF-151 or Atlanta, they coordinate with other
coalitions through a military coordination mechanism known as Shared Awareness and
De-confliction (SHADE). The main countries taking part in the anti-piracy national
escort system are Russia, China, and India. 123
B. Regional Measures
Paralleled to international efforts to suppress Somali pirates, regional efforts are also
taken. There are many regional efforts such as Arab League conference on Somali
pirates. However, Djibouti Code of Conduct is the most important regional mechanism
because it contains new measures and rules of engagement to counter Somali pirates.
Also, Djibouti Code of Conduct was sponsored by key international and regional
organization and contains practical steps tackling Somali piracy. Therefore, this section
focus on Djibouti code of conduct as unique regional anti-piracy effort against Somali
pirates.
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1. The Djibouti Code of Conduct
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) launched a successful international
anti-piracy program in the late of 1990s which successfully engaged regional countries in
on multilateral basis to improve anti-piracy cooperation. This program succeeded in
suppressing piracy in the Strait of Malacca and other regions in Asia. 124
With the emergence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the IMO has attempted to adopt
the same cooperative mechanisms against piracy in the Horn of Africa. In 2005, the IMO
began sponsoring consultation meetings on piracy in the Horn of Africa region, which
developed into a draft of a cooperative framework agreement in early 2008. In January
2009, representatives of seventeen regional governments met at an IMO-sponsored
meeting in Djibouti and adopted a Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy
and Armed Robbery against Ships in the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. By
the end of January 2009, nine regional governments had signed the Code of Conduct,
which remains open for signature by other parties. 125 The agreement established
procedures for coordinating responses to piracy and sharing best practices among law
enforcement and security personnel. Accordingly, three regional facilities—the Maritime
Rescue Coordination Centre in Mombasa, Kenya, the Sub-Regional Coordination Centre
in Dar el Salaam, Tanzania, and a regional maritime information center that is to be
established in Sana’a, Yemen—are planned to support the information sharing
components of the agreement. The parties also agreed to resolutions on technical
cooperation and the establishment of a regional training center in Djibouti. In September
2009, Japan made a contribution of $14 million to in support for the IMO’s Djibouti
Code-related training and capacity building operations. 126
The importance of the Djibouti Code comes from ―addressing local concerns over
sovereignty, territorial water rights, and the presence of foreign military forces in regional
waters.‖It was a proactive imitative to engage regional countries in the international antipiracy measures taking place off the coast of Somalia. 127
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V. Critical Analysis of Anti- Somali Piracy Measures
To begin with, the international community should be accredited for its unusual
proactive stance toward the crisis of piracy in the Gulf of Aden. For the first time,
genuine anti-piracy measures were adopted. In fact, those measures went far beyond the
traditional measures specified in international law. Indeed, throughout the entire crisis,
Somalia has been used as a testing ground to new set of tryout rules of engagement and
anti-piracy measures. To now, multiple measures are developing in multiple directions.
Briefly, the top three new measures adopted by international community are the
following: (a) deploying the biggest anti-piracy fleet in the modern history, (b) allowing
anti-piracy navies to enter the territorial waters of Somalia upon the consent of TFG and
notification of UN Secretary-General, and (3) the current attempt to bring pirates into
justice while considering establishing special tribunals for pirates.
Actually, deploying those massive anti-piracy missions shows an unprecedented
level of coordination among states in suppressing piracy. No piracy activities have
received such attention before.
Signs of Failure of Anti-Somali Piracy Efforts
However, the difficult question is, whether those genuine anti-piracy measures have
been effective in suppressing Somali pirates. The answer is negative. Facts on the ground
and statistics on pirates’ attacks prove the negative outcome of anti-piracy measures
adopted in the Gulf of Aden. Despite the intensive military presence off the coast of
Somalia, it is clear that both international and regional efforts to suppress piracy off the
coast of Somalia have miserably failed.
Statistics have shown a major boost in piracy activities off Somali waters. A special
increase was noted in pirate attacks in terms of range, number of captured vessels, and
number of attempted attacks. Five years ago, the maximum range of attacks was 287km,
now it reached 2,037km from the Somali coast and only 926km from the coast of
India.128 In March 2010 alone, there were nine hijackings. Currently, there are eight
vessels being held by Somali pirates, with roughly 160 hostages on board. The EU naval
force (Navfor) says the rate of pirate activity in March 2010 alone was double that of the
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three months from September to November 2009.129 Pirate’s big appetite for ships seems
to be unaffected by the intensive forces patrolling waters off the Somali coast. Therefore,
warships have failed to deter pirates.
International anti-piracy measures have failed in another respect. Although all antipiracy resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council stressed upon: ―reaffirming of the
relevant provisions of international law with respect to the repression of piracy…
Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and
unity of Somalia,‖130 international anti-piracy measures adopted by UN Security Council
go beyond the traditional anti-piracy measures specified by international law; allowing
navies not only to track pirates in Somali waters but also to target pirates’ land bases.
Those anti-piracy measures undermine sovereignty and the territorial integrity of
Somalia. Further Security Council stresses that those measure exceptional and are only
applicable for Somalia. Therefore, the UN Security Council seems to be intentionally
infringing Somalia’s sovereignty contrary to the preamble of its anti-piracy resolutions on
Somali piracy.
Despite the scale of the anti-piracy mission dedicated to curb Somali pirates,
international measures against Somali piracy are counter-productive because such
measures are impractical and misguided. Practical constrains and legal complexities
make Somali anti-piracy efforts appear to be futile.
A. Practical Constraints
Policing the waves is an impossible task, given the size of the area within the reach of
Somali pirates. Somali piracy is an ―expanding phenomenon, both in terms of level of
activity and range.‖131 International naval forces operate in a zone extending from south
of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and part of the Indian Ocean, including the Seychelles,
which represents an area comparable to that of the Mediterranean. 132 The chief
commander of EU’s operation Atlanta said that there are altogether about twenty
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warships to cover an area ten times larger than Germany. 133Given the massive volume of
shipping in the region ―the safety of all ships can not be guaranteed due to the often long
response times due to the considerable distances involved.‖134
Therefore, there is a significant challenge for international navies to patrol the
massive waters surrounding the long Somali coast, even with its largest anti-piracy fleet
in modern history. The geographical location is a major practical constraint in the way of
international efforts to suppress piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Somali pirates simply
adapted their technique to the presence of naval powers. Pirates have simply shifted their
operations from the Gulf of Aden towards the open waters, in the direction of the western
Indian Ocean.
Another practical constraint facing anti-piracy missions is the factor of time.
According to reports, ―most vessels under attack have less than 15 to 30 minutes between
the first sighting of the pirates and their boarding of the ship and taking of hostages.‖ If a
naval ship fails to arrive on the scene within those first 15 to 30 minutes, it will be too
late to prevent the ship’s capture. Generally, naval combatant ships can steam at speeds
of up to 30 knots, while the speed of pirates’ skiffs reach 53 knots using the Yamaha 150
horsepower motors.135 Pirates’ boasts are faster than warships. Thus, unless a naval ship
happens to be few miles away when a commercial ship comes under attack, it will not
arrive until after (perhaps long after) the fifteen to thirty minutes window has come and
gone. Given the large area of water to be patrolled and the relatively small number of
naval ships available means that the closest naval ship is often far too distant to arrive
within that tight timeframe. 136 Once pirates are on board and the hijacked vessel under
control, any attempt of rescue becomes too risky.
To sum up, considerable practical factors stand in the way of international anti-piracy
missions operating in the Gulf of Aden. Somali pirates continue to be successful in what
they do, as factors of time, distance, and speed are on their side. The element of surprise
puts anti-piracy navies on the defensive. The phenomenon of Somali piracy has
illustrated the limits of a military option in preventing or even suppressing piracy.
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1. The Negative Implications of Military Intervention in Suppressing Piracy in the
Gulf of Aden:
After examining the practical constraints facing international navies, it is time to
explore the serious negative implications of using force in suppressing Somali piracy.
The Security Council was acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations
allowing the use of force. All Security Council Resolutions regarding Somalia have one
sentence in common which is ―states fighting piracy may use all necessary means to
repress acts of piracy and armed robbery.‖137 Many voices are demanding the use of
decisive force in dealing with Somali pirates in support of risky rescue military
operations. The UN envoy to Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, backed military
operations saying they "are sending a strong message to the pirates and, more
importantly, to their backers who are exploiting the poverty and desperation of their
young, unemployed compatriots."138 Also, the UN International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
head Noel Choong said: "We support the robust response against the pirates." 139
Indeed,CTF-151 killed alone 10 pirates in a period of 7 months. 140
However, excessive use of force by international navies in suppressing Somali pirates
has four serious repercussions. It leads to retaliation. It causes further humiliation to
Somali people, as it eradicates the sovereignty of Somalia. In addition, it increases the
death tool among civilians.
First and foremost, the use of force in suppressing Somali pirates has proven to be
counter productive. Although Somali pirates use heavy weapons in their hijacking, they
rarely inflict any harm on their hostages, cargo, or the hijacked ship. Most hostages
acknowledge the humane treatment they receive during their detention. Hostages’
personal belongs have not been touched. The content of the hijacked cargos is kept safe.
Unlike traditional pirates who accompany their piratical activities with long list of crimes
which expand to include murder, rape, and theft. Although Somali pirates are heavy
armed, they have used violence under precautions. Somali pirates have only one single
demand, ransom. Pirates of the Gulf of Aden directly communicate with the ship owner.
137
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However, in a number of incidents, anti-piracy missions’ use of violence has provoked
Somali pirates groups to take revenge. Consequently, a cycle of violence and retaliation
between the two sides has been initiated. Use of force by warships to apprehend or kill
pirate suspects has raised feelings of revenge especially among pirates whose associates
are killed or captured.141 For example, after three Somali pirates were killed in the US
military rescue operation to release the captain of the MV Maersk Alabam, Somali pirates
attacked an American freighter with rockets to "destroy" the ship in revenge. A Somali
pirate commander Abdi Garad told AFP, that:
We intended to destroy this American-flagged ship and the crew on board but
unfortunately they narrowly escaped us. The aim of this attack was totally
different. We were not after a ransom. We also assigned a team with special
equipment to chase and destroy any ship flying the American flag in retaliation for
the brutal killing of our friends.142
According to sources close to the pirates, French ships were also prime targets following
the rescue of the Tanit yacht in which a hostage and two pirates were killed. 143 Violence
only begets violence. Further, escalation of violence seems to be the new trend. The
paradox is that warships, which are responsible for protecting vessels carrying their
state’s flag, maximize the threat of pirate attacks upon its flag vessels rather alleviating
the threat. In other words, warships are doing more harm to vessels carrying their flag
then.
Secondly, authorizing warships to enter Somali territorial waters to fights pirates
violates the sovereignty of Somalia which leads to further humiliation of the Somali
people. There are widespread feelings of suspicion among Somalis toward foreign navies.
Many are skeptical of their agenda, while other fear those anti-piracy missions might be a
form of indirect occupation. Feelings of animosity were aroused after French military
executed land operations against Somali pirates. From time to time, US send missile
attacks against targets of Al-Qaeda in Somalia. Many innocent Somalis fall dead in such
land operations. Somalis feel that the international community has failed them and give
the green light to superpowers to hunt Somalis. Indeed, a sense of conspiracy and mutual
mistrust dominates the feelings of Somalis toward warship patrolling Somali waters. That
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is largely due to UN did not extend its mandate allowing warships patrolling Somali
waters to prevent illegal fishing or nuclear waste dumping. None of the Security Council
resolutions mentioned illegal fishing or hazardous waste dumping. 144 That is why the
Somalis accuse Security Council of double standards. For example, Obama said that the
pirates must be held accountable for their crimes. Many Somalis want to know when the
western world will be held accountable for dumping nuclear toxic waste and illegal
fishing.145 Consequently, international anti-piracy coalitions lost the hearts and minds of
Somalis, while pirates gain more popularity inside. Thus, excessive use of force against
pirates sometimes leads to unfavorable outcomes.
In the final analysis, although deploying warships to suppress Somali pirates is a
needed measure to deter them, this measure failed to achieve its purpose because of
serious practical constrains limits its effectiveness. Further, excessive use of force in
apprehending or killing pirates has danger implications on the long run.
B. Legal Complexities
A long list of various legal complexities, related to capturing, holding, and
prosecuting of Somali pirates, has doomed international anti-piracy missions to
failure. Serious legal complexities surrounding anti-piracy operations in the Gulf
of Aden do exist.
The case of Somali piracy sheds light upon logistic and legal difficulties face
anti-piracy effort which attempt to bring Somali pirates into justice, in order to
be held accountable for their crimes. However, this appears to be difficult task.
Mix of logistical, legal, operational and political difficulties make chances to bring
pirates to justice are remote.146 There are challenges to prosecute pirates in the
stages of capturing, detention, and trial.
To begin with, capturing of pirates by warship is extremely difficult because
Somali pirates use smart evasive strategies to escape navies. If a warship appears
in the scene before pirates can take control of the attacked ship, then there is a
fair chance of catching them. However, once pirates see a warship approaching
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their speedboats, they flee in different directions, making it impossible to catch
all of them. Therefore, a warship will decide to go after one speedboat and leave
the rest of the pirates in other speedboats escape. If the warship is about to
capture pirates onboard the speedboat, pirates quickly drop their weapons in the
sea and destroy evidence. Therefore, when the military personals search the boat,
they find nothing. When pirates are faced with the crime of piracy, they deny the
crime and claim that they are illegal migrants to a neighboring state. Now, it is
extremely hard to prove their crime. Lack of evidence is e a major challenge
which undermines the process of prosecution. Prosecution and bringing pirates
to trail becomes pointless and a waste of time and resources. Large numbers of
pirates have been acquitted due to lack of material evidence.147
The second stage towards bringing pirates to justice is holding them after
their capture and transferring them to the country in which they will be
prosecuted. After the capture of Somali pirates, they will be detained within the
warship which made the arrest. However, the task of transferring pirate suspects
to face trial is a heavy burden on navies operating in the region. The process of
transferring arrested suspects is both costly and time consuming which affects
the overall performance of warships’ roles in patrolling their assigned area.
Therefore, many pirate suspects spend long duration of time in detention on
board of warships without facing any crime. This delays their prosecution with no
specific time table for their prosecution.148 Because of lack of evidence and
logistical difficulties in transferring pirates to face trial, many navies avoid this
complication by releasing pirates from their custody after disarming them. For
example, in the period of January 2009 to August 2009, CTF-151 ―encountered 527
pirates; 282 of which were disarmed and released, 235 disarmed and turned over for
prosecution, and 10 were killed.‖ 149 It is worth noting that the number of released pirates
is larger than the number of those turned in prosecution.150 As a result, anti-piracy navies
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operating off the Somali waters have already lost its deterrence affect upon pirates. This
simply sends wrong signals to pirates. In response, pirates have become more aggressive
and undeterred by navies patrolling Somali waters.
The last stage is prosecuting the pirates to face a fair trial. The first question is where
to prosecute pirate suspects. Although international law gives all the states jurisdiction to
prosecute pirates, few states are willing to do so. Few states have adopted the crime of
piracy in their national legislation. In the beginning, western navies were eager to
prosecute pirates in their countries. However, western navies are now discouraged from
doing so for number of reasons. First, the long distance between the theaters of antipiracy operations from the home country makes the transfer process exhaustive and
costly. Secondly, many pirates, who are acquitted of their crimes and released, have
turned into asylum seekers and have refused to go back to Somalia. This has created
further burden to on the western countries that carry the entire prosecution process.
Therefore, anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden have tried to avoid this
complication by transferring pirates to neighboring regional states, mainly Kenya and
Yemen. However, those two countries have inefficient judicial systems. Kenya, for
example, has been subject to brutal criticism from human rights activists for inhumane
acts which suspects commonly receive during detention, prosecution and imprisonment.
Kenyan prisons are already overcrowded. It was reported that a suspect may wait as long
as a year for his or her trial to be held. Anti-piracy missions, with the support of EU and
UN, have allocated funds to improve the judicial systems in those countries. In other
words, it was an attempt to buy the consent of Yemeni and Kenyan authorities to receive
pirates with no question. A fair trail to pirates is hard to guarantee. That is why many
observers see anti-piracy navies useless and are a show for the international media.
Others call it ―beauty contest.‖ In a recent development, Kenya officially declared its
refusal to receive any more pirates for prosecution claiming that the burden of
prosecution is not equally shared with other countries concerned with piracy in the Gulf
of Aden.
To sum up, legal complexities surround the arrest, detention, transfer, and prosecution
of pirates. Legal complexities no longer hold pirates accountable for their crimes and
turns piracy into a less risky business.
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Anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden are deeply constrained by practical
constraints and legal complexities. As a result, Somali pirates continue to expand their
operation undeterred. The negative outcome of the biggest anti-piracy mission in modern
history fuels feeling of frustration and shock.
c. Misguided Efforts
Although the international community has adopted genuine efforts to suppress piracy
in the Gulf of Aden, those efforts are counter productive. That is because these antipiracy measures are simply misguided, they continue to ignore Somalia and fail to
address factors contributing to the spread of piracy in Somalia.
All of the Security Council resolutions have tackled Somali piracy while disregarding
to Somalia. In other words, the international community has dealt with piracy as a
separate problem without looking to the bigger picture. Thus, the international
community needs to look at the bigger picture and to carefully analyze factors
contributing to the spread of piracy especially off the cost of Somali. The solution to
piracy lies in the land not in the sea.
The most powerful weapon against piracy will be peace and opportunity in
Somalia, coupled with an effective and reliable police force and judiciary.
Containing or ignoring Somalia and its problems is not an option that will
end well. 151
As we have seen, little has been done to improve Somalia’s harsh realities. The positive
side of piracy is shedding some light on the ongoing tragedy in Somalia, the forgotten
country. It seems that the international community pretends to ignore Somalia.
Nonetheless, Somali piracy has brought Somali back into surface. Ignoring Somalia is not
an option.
International efforts have been fixed on the sea and not toward the shore.
Commanders of anti-piracy navies have only now realized that the solution to piracy lies
on land not in the sea. Warships may reduce the number of pirates’ attacks, but they can
not uproot piracy form the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.
Attention slowly is moving toward Somalia. However, efforts continue to be
misguided. Funds allocated to Somalia rarely benefit Somalia and its people. It can be
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argued that funds allocated to Somalia and fighting Somali piracy ends in foreign pockets
away from Somalia.
Regional and international anti-piracy efforts are only focusing on military operations and
prosecution of pirates. Instead of fixing Somalia’s judicial institutions, massive funds have been
assigned to Somalia’s neighboring countries to improve their judicial systems to be well-equipped
to prosecute Somali pirates. Enormous funds have been directed to that purpose. A US National
Security Council report recommends that the US has to seek agreements and arrangements to
formalize custody and prosecution arrangements with regional states. 152

In this regard, an

agreement was signed between EU and Kenya on the 6th of March 2009, giving the Kenyan
authorities the right to prosecute pirates. Indeed, regional countries offered their services on the
war against pirates in exchange for funds which should have been spent on Somalia in the first
place.
When regional countries, as Kenya, were no longer able to prosecute pirates, international
community is considering establishing international tribunals for pirates. Additional funds would
be directed in this direction. The international media would closely monitor those tribunals, while
Somalia’s judicial system would continue to be marginalized.

At the Donor Conference on Somalia, hosted by the EU on 23rd April 2009, UN
proposed raising $166 million to be raised- $135 million for African Union's military mission
to Somalia (AMISOM) and only $31 million for the Somalia security forces .153 More than two

thirds of the fund is allocated to the 4,350 foreign troops of AMISOM while the Somali
army and police force continue to suffer from lack of funds, training, arms and
ammunition. The TFG fails to pay the salaries of its police forces because of lack of
resources. Somalis have expressed their frustration at the way the funds are allocated.
Massive funds were dedicated to anti-piracy military operations. The joint funding of only the
EU’s Atlanta operation alone amounts to EUR 8.3 million. The cost of patrolling Somali waters is
very expensive. Unfortunately, all those funds are misguided. In a sense, those funds are directed
to tackling piracy, apart form Somalia. If those funds were reallocated to development, poverty
reduction, supporting Somali police forces and government’s institutions, piracy would be
affected. The stronger i the government, the weaker the pirates are.
The international community has to reconsider the viability of durable solution for piracy
rather than heavily investing in unsustainable military options which have been proven to be
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ineffective and costly. Neither supporting AMISOM, anti-piracy operations, regional

countries’ judicial systems nor establishing international tribunals will suppress piracy in
the Gulf of Aden. Redirecting a portion of those funds to rebuilding Somalia’s
government institutions is the key to a durable solution to piracy. The stronger Somalia,
the weaker the pirates are. The current misguided anti-piracy efforts have to refocus on
rebuilding the Somali state where the roots of the problem are found.
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VI. The Way Forward
It is time for the international community to invest in a durable solution for
Somali piracy. A comprehensive approach has to be adopted in fighting piracy. Ending
piracy requires a well-integrated anti-piracy plan with short, medium and long-term
measures. Tackling the roots of piracy in Somalia is the way forward.
First, international community need to openly confront the issue of illegal fishing
and dumping of nuclear waste off Somali waters, in order to gain credibility form the
Somali people. Indeed, international community should provide technical assistance to
developing countries unable to protect its territorial waters, and its economic interests in
their exclusive economic zones. Continuing to be silent about illegal fishing and waste
dumping committed by European and Asian commercial vessels would strengthen the
pirates’ claim of protecting Somali waters. Second, improving the conditions of coastal
communities is a good starting point. Third, international community should fight piracy
by fighting poverty, unemployment in Somalia. Therefore, international community
needs to adopt radical changes in its strategies to combat piracy.
In the final analysis, I would argue that there are two set of factors contributing to
Somali piracy: factors relating to Somalia in general and factors relating to coastal
Somali communities specifically. The first set of factors feeding piracy is the current
chaotic political situation which is marked by an ineffective central government, civil
war, and tribal welfare. The second set of factors contributing to piracy originates from
Somali coastal communities, the breeding ground of pirates. What drives coastal
communities toward piracy are illegal fishing, nuclear waste dumping, and poverty.
Consequently, anti-piracy measures have to respond to those two sets of factors feeding
piracy in Somalia. Before the situation can be resolved, international and regional antipiracy efforts will continue to be misguided and surely ineffective. Generalized responses
to piracy are a shortcut to failure.
Anti-piracy measures have to respond to the roots of the problem in order to
guarantee its effectiveness in the long-term. Undoubtedly, building a military coalition to
patrol ships passing by Somali waters is a needed measure to deter pirates. However, it is
crucial to ask ourselves to what extent such measures are sustainable and to what extent
they responds to the roots of the problem.
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Regional and international anti-piracy efforts should meet the following three goals:
(1) strengthening Somalia’s central government to impose rule of law, (2) reviving
Somalia’s economy to provide an alternative to piracy, and (3) solving the problems of
Somali coastal communities’ especially illegal fishing and nuclear waste dumping off
Somali waters.
Any future anti-piracy measure has to comply with the following criteria. Firstly, the
anti-piracy measure has to be compatible with international law. Secondly, it has to
respond to the social and economic factors contributing to the emergence of piracy. The
arsenal of anti-piracy tools has to expand to include trust building mechanisms with local
communities. New and customized anti-piracy measures should be tailored to the specific
circumstances of each case of piracy. In this decisive moment, the international
community must revise its strategies in responding to piracy and today’s fragile maritime
security regime has to be re-examined. Difficult questions have to be answered. Only
then Somali piracy becomes a history.
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Appendix A: Map of Somalia 154

154 Somalia Map, Congressional Cartography Program, Library of Congress, adapted by CRS
Graphics.(US. Sept.28, 2009) http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40528.pdf
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Appendix B: Horn of Africa: Shipping Routes155.
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Appendix C: Range of Attacks156
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Appendix D: Statistics Jan-Sept. 2009157

Source: 2009, ICC International Maritime Bureau
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Appendix E: Territorial Waters, Economic Zone and International Waters158
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